Abstract-Organizations use security policies to regulate how they share and exchange information, e.g., under what conditions data can be exchanged, what protocols are to be used, who is granted access, etc. Agreement on specific policies is achieved though policy reconciliation, where multiple parties, with possibly different policies, exchange their security policies, resolve differences, and reach a consensus. Current solutions for policy reconciliation do not take into account the privacy concerns of reconciliating parties. This paper addresses the problem of preserving privacy during security policy reconciliation. We introduce new protocols that meet the privacy requirements of the organizations and allow parties to find a common policy rule which maximizes their individual preferences.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sharing of sensitive information between organizations is a very challenging task. The difficulty lies not only in the structure of the resources that parties want to share, but also in the security policy rules that govern what data can be shared and how it can be shared. To control such interactions, (two or more) participants have to accept a set of rules that they will follow for the duration of the interaction. Each party has to express their desired security rules in a common format and follow a protocol with the other parties. The process will determine which rules control their future interactions. This protocol is called a reconciliation protocol and its output is a security policy that is consistent with the security requirements of all the participants. If such a policy exists, the participants can continue their collaboration. Otherwise, they can decide not to collaborate or they can decide to modify their requirements and repeat the protocol. Requirements for the wireless provider and the network user. The wireless provider wants to maintain a secure network but still provide compatibility and service to customers with older devices, while the user wants to achieve maximum battery life and still get service.
The importance of security policy reconciliation is tied to the importance of communication in general. One prominent field of application is mobile communication. In mobile communication networks, users must form associations with different network providers as they roam from one network to another. To form such associations, the user and the network provider have to agree on a set of attributes that will govern their interaction (authentication, type of connection, underlying security, etc.). Both the provider and the user can represent their requirements in form of a security policy that captures their individual needs. It is possible-and likely-that each party will have a wide range of policies that satisfy their individual communication requirements, ranked in some order of preference. Obviously, participants may have conflicting preferences. For example, the network provider may want to use strong encryption whenever possible, but might still be willing to support certain weaker encryption mechanisms, or no encryption at all, so that it can provide service to older mobile devices. The mobile user, on the other hand, might prefer to maximize the battery life of his mobile device and therefore prefer not to use encryption whenever possible (see Figure 1 ).
Revealing their policies to the other party may not negatively impact the reconciliation process itself. It, however, can pose a major security risk since any disclosure of security policy can be misused by an attacker to compromise the system. Continuing our example, an attacker may exploit the knowledge that the wireless provider is willing to provide service without requiring "strong crypto" to mount a series of attacks [1] . Of course, in our example, the parties can easily discover each other's security policies, since they only involve a single attribute, i.e., the use of encryption. We deliberately keep our example simple to illustrate why preserving privacy during policy reconciliation is crucial. One can easily envision scenarios between organizations that will require the reconciliation of policies that include a large number of attributes (types of users, types of data, protocols, etc.). Obviously, meeting the privacy objective of each organization in those cases is much more important. In this paper we show that it can effectively be met by means of privacy-preserving policy reconciliation.
In general, a security policy is a collection of rules that express which actions are permitted and disallowed in systems [2] . It can take the form of specific access control rules [3] , policy credentials [4] , or security policy language statements [5] . In this paper, we address policies that govern collaboration and communication between a number of parties. In particular, these policies specify the algorithms, protocols, and any other parameters that must be agreed upon to ensure that the security needs of all parties are met.
The problem of policy reconciliation, in its most general form, is intractable [6] , [7] . For this reason, previous work has focused on policy reconciliation for specific representations of a security policy [8] , or by using heuristic algorithms to achieve tractability. While such approaches are effective in 1-4244-0353-7/07/$25.00 ©2007 IEEE This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the ICC 2007 proceedings.
reconciling policies, they do not take into account privacy requirements of the participants. Ideally, upon termination of a reconciliation protocol, the parties should have only revealed the part of their policy that enables them to form the association and nothing more. Our work addresses privacypreservation in policy reconciliation. In particular, as the main contribution of this paper we introduce new policy reconciliation protocols that meet the privacy objective while maximizing the preferences of all parties.
II. RELATED WORK
Security Policy Reconciliation: Gong and Qian in [6] analyze the complexity of secure interoperation between systems with heterogeneous access control structures. They proved that composing authorization policies is NP-complete. McDaniel and Prakash defined the Ismene policy language [9] which permits the specification and reconciliation of group security requirements. In [7] , they show that general purpose provisioning policy reconciliation is intractable. Wang et al. demonstrate that it is possible to structure security policies in such a way that policy reconciliation becomes tractable [8] . Zao et al. propose the Security Policy System (SPS) which resolves IPsec security associations between domains of communication [10] . Reconciliation is achieved by intersecting sets of policy values. Dinsmore et al. [11] present the Dynamic Cryptographic Context Management project in which security policies are negotiated between dynamic groups of participants. Their protocol involves multiple rounds of negotiation between the participants, eventually producing a common policy that all of them agree upon. Our work focuses on ensuring privacy during policy reconciliation and not on the reconciliation algorithm.
Automated Trust Negotiation: First proposed by Winsborough et al. [12] , it is the procedure where two parties exchange digitally signed credentials that contain attribute information to establish trust and make access control decisions. In environments like the Internet where there may be few or no pre-existing relationships, parties that seek to form a trust relationship might be unwilling to release sensitive credentials [13] , [14] . To overcome this difficulty, a number of schemes have been proposed recently that use cryptography or multiple rounds of negotiations to protect protecting credentials and attributes [15] , [16] , [17] . In automated trust negotiation, participants specify access control policies for the disclosure of credentials. The negotiation phase consists of a sequence of exchanges that are controlled by the access control policies defined for the credentials. At each round, parties gain higher levels of mutual trust, permitting access control policies for more sensitive credentials to be satisfied, which in turn enable these credentials to be exchanged.
In security policy reconciliation, there are no additional access control policies put in place to protect the policies that the parties try to reconcile. Instead, each participant presents its individual security policies and subsequently the cryptographic protocol determines the subset of policies that satisfy all parties. 
Privacy-Preserving Protocols:
Freedman et al. [18] consider the problem of computing the intersection of private datasets of two parties and analyze their protocol under a number of threat models. Their solution is based on representing sets as roots of polynomials. Kissner and Song [19] , [20] extend the results of [18] to utilize properties of polynomials beyond evaluation at given points. Their work provides privacy-preserving operations for union, intersection, and element reduction. The main contribution of our paper is that we build on the privacy-preserving operations results in [18] to construct two new and more complex privacypreserving protocol for security policy reconciliation with preferences for two different notions of fair reconciliation.
In addition, we demonstrate how the existing results can be applied to the problem of security policy reconciliation in the absence of preferences in a straight-forward manner.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we summarize the definitions, notation, and objectives used throughout this paper. Furthermore, we briefly review existing privacy-preserving primitives that we use as tools in our new privacy-preserving policy reconciliation protocols introduced in Section IV and the Appendix.
A. Policy Representation
To reconcile their policies, organizations must first agree on a common representation. This allows them to compare their policies and determine whether a common subset exists. Otherwise the problem of policy reconciliation becomes intractable [6] , [7] . In this work, we represent a policy as a matrix. The rows represent individual policy rules and the columns are the attributes for each rule. Consequently, security policies are represented as bitstrings, which can be easily manipulated and operated on.
We illustrate our policy representation by continuing the example from Section I. The first step is for the participants to agree on a set of attributes that will be used to define security policy rules. In our example, we have settled for three attributes defining the underlying use of encryption, 3DES, DES, and None. Then, each participant represents its requirements by defining rules in order of preference. In our example, the wireless provider prefers increased security but is willing to accommodate older devices, whereas the user want to maximize battery life, but is willing to compromise and use encryption if that is required to access the network.
n is a bit-string of length n indicating whether a field a ij , j = 1, . . . , n is defined or not. A policy P A is a set of rules
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k×n . Attribute A j is a string of characters that uniquely represents the j-th field of the policy rules. In our example from Figure 2 , 3DES, DES and None are the attributes defined in the security policy. Rule a 1 for the wireless provider is the bit-string (1, 0, 0) specifying that he requires the use of 3DES. 
Definition 3.4: A policy preference order composition scheme takes two policy preference orders ≤ A on a policy P A and ≤ B on P B as input and combines them to a joint (partial or total) order ≤ AB on P A ∩ P B . Examples for preference order composition schemes are:
Definition 3.5: The sum of ranks composition scheme combines ≤ A on P A and ≤ B on P B to the joint total preference order ≤ AB defined as follows:
Definition 3.6: The maximized minimum of ranks composition scheme combines ≤ A on P A and ≤ B on P B to the joint total preference order ≤ AB as follows:
B. Protocols for Privacy-Preserving Policy Reconciliation
Drawing on the previous definitions, we now introduce the protocols for privacy-preserving policy reconciliation.
Policy reconciliation in general has the single objective of two parties determining those policy rules they have in common. In the course of conventional reconciliation protocols, at least one of the two parties learns more of the other party's policies than just what the two parties have in common. As discussed previously, the latter constitutes a major problem in situations where privacy is of primary concern.
While on one hand, privacy-preservation allows for naturally extending the objective for policy reconciliation, it on the other hand also leads to distinguishing different levels of privacy. In particular, introducing privacy-preservation to the objective of policy reconciliation will prevent parties from disclosing any information to the other party aside from the policies they have in common. The disclosure of information can be further limited (thus increasing the level of privacy) by not revealing the actual policies they share but instead disclosing only the number of policies the parties have in common. Recognizing preferences on policies as additional sensitive information, the primary objective can be extended to having the two parties not learn anything about the other party other than the policy that maximizes both parties' combined preferences.
Keeping these different privacy considerations in mind, we define the three different protocols for privacy-preserving policy reconciliation as follows:
Protocol 1: A privacy-preserving common policy scheme (PCP) is a two-party protocol between parties A and B. Their respective private policies P A and P B are drawn from the same domain of policy rules (see Remark 3.1). Upon completion of the protocol, A and B learn nothing else about each other's private policies but which policy rules they have in common. I.e., if a PCP takes P A and P B as input, then A and B learn P A ∩ P B .
A PCP scheme thus allows two parties to reveal nothing but their common policy rules to each other during reconciliation.
Protocol 2: A privacy-preserving common policy cardinality scheme (PC 2 ) is a two-party protocol between parties A and B. Their respective private policies P A and P B are drawn from the same domain of policy rules (see Remark 3.1). Upon completion of the protocol, A and B learn nothing about each other's private policies but the number of policy rules they have in common. I.e., if a PC 2 takes P A and P B as input, then A and B learn |P A ∩ P B | and nothing else.
A PC 2 thus allows two parties A and B to determine how many policy rules they have in common without revealing any other information to each other. A PC 2 protocol could, for example, be used by A and B to first determine the number of policies they have in common before reconciling their policies through a PCP protocol.
Protocol 3: A privacy-preserving preferencemaximizing policy reconciliation scheme for a preference order composition scheme C (3PR C ) is a multi-round twoparty protocol between parties A and B. Their respective policies P A and P B are drawn from the same domain of policy rules (see Remark 3.1). Upon completion of the protocol, A and B learn nothing about each other's policies but one common policy rule max that maximizes the combined preference order ≤ AB of ≤ A and ≤ B under C as well as in which round of the protocol max was determined. I.e., if 3PR
C takes P A , P B , ≤ A , and ≤ B as input, then A and B learn max x∈PA∩PB ;≤AB {x}.
Note that in a 3PR
C scheme, the two parties should not learn anything about any other policy rules of the respective other party and nothing about the other party's preferences other than what can be deduced from the run or the output of the protocol. Furthermore, the scheme must enforce the output to maximize the combined preference order for the composition scheme in question. This guarantees the two parties that they reconcile their preferences in a fair way, i.e., according to an agreed upon preference composition scheme. Consequently, none of the parties has the power to set its preferences over the other party's preferences. The different preference composition schemes can hereby be used to express different notions of fairness in the reconciliation process.
C. Adversary Model and Privacy Requirements
We now describe the adversary models used in the remainder of this paper. Furthermore, we define the security and
Semi-Honest Model.
In the semi-honest model, all parties act according to their prescribed actions in the protocol. 1 A PCP, a PC 2 , or a 3PR C protocol is privacy-preserving in the semihonest model, if no party gains information about the other party's private input other than what can be deduced from the output of the protocol and its own private input. In other words, for each party there exists a simulator that produces an output distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from the other party's view executing the real protocol (see [21] for the formal definition of privacy-preservation in the semihonest model). Note that while for a PCP and a PC 2 scheme the private inputs are the policies P A and P B only, the private input in the 3PR C additionally includes the preference orders of A and B.
Malicious Model. In the malicious model, each party may behave arbitrarily. As detailed in [21] , one cannot prevent a party from (1) refusing to participate in the protocol; (2) substituting its private input at the beginning of the protocol; or (3) aborting the protocol before completion. Intuitively, a two-party protocol is said to be privacy-preserving in the malicious model, if apart from the unavoidable deviations no other deviation of one malicious party leads to information leakage about the other (honest) party's private input, other than what can be deduced from the run or the output of the protocol. 2 Similarly, we say that a 3PR C scheme is preferencemaximizing in the malicious model, if apart from the unavoidable deviations no other deviation of one malicious party can lead to an output the malicious party prefers over the one that maximizes the combined preference order.
D. Privacy-Preserving Tools
Privacy-Preserving Set Intersection: In [18] , Freedman et al. present a protocol to compute the intersection of two data sets in a privacy-preserving way. Their private matching scheme is a two-party protocol between a chooser C and a sender S. At the beginning of the protocol, both parties have private data sets (Z C and Z S ) drawn from some common domain. At the conclusion of the protocol, the chooser learns the intersection Z C ∩ Z S , but nothing about any other data in Z S . The server learns nothing about any data in Z C . That is,
Freedman et al. prove that their protocol is privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model. For data sets of size O(k), the protocols results in a communication overhead of O(k) and computational overhead of O(k ln ln k).
The Freedman protocol is based on a semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme: If E is a public encryption 1 Note that the parties may keep a record of all their intermediate computations. 2 As a consequence of the three above mentioned unpreventable actions a malicious party can take, a PCP scheme, for example, can never prevent a malicious party from extracting the other parties policy: the malicious party simply substitutes its own input with a policy containing all possible policy rules and consequently learns the honest parties policy as output of the PCP scheme. Similarly, a PC 2 scheme cannot protect the cardinality of an honest party's private input policy against a malicious party. function of a homomorphic encryption scheme, then, given the ciphertexts c 1 = E(m 1 ) and c 2 = E(m 2 ), the ciphertext c * = E(m 1 + m 2 ) can be computed efficiently without knowledge of the private key. Similarly, given c = E(m) and some r from the group of plaintexts, then c * = E(rm) can be computed efficiently without knowledge of the private key. A public encryption function E is semantically secure if it is computationally infeasible for an attacker to derive significant information about a plaintext given only its ciphertext and the public encryption key. An example of a semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme is Paillier's cryptosystem [22] . The homomorphic property of an encryption function E implies that anyone in possession of the encrypted coefficients of a polynomial f (X) can compute a valid encryption of f (y) for any y from the group of plaintexts without the knowledge of the private key or the coefficients. In particular, for any known plaintexts y 1 , y 2 and any known constant r, a valid encryption E(rf (y 1 ) + y 2 ) can be computed without the knowledge of the private key or the coefficients of f (X).
Private Cardinality Matching: In [18] , Freedman et al. also present a protocol to compute the cardinality of the intersection of two data sets that is privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model. In fact, this protocol is a variant of the set intersection protocol. The chooser learns nothing about the data sets of the server, except for the cardinality of the intersection of the chooser's and the server's data sets. 3 
For data sets of size O(k), the protocols results in a communication overhead of O(k) and computational overhead of O(k ln ln k).

IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING RECONCILIATION WITH PREFERENCES
Building on the work of Freedman et al. it is possible to build protocols for PC 2 and PCP in a straight-forward manner (see Appendix). However, implementing a 3PR C schemes requires some sophisticated protocol design. The main contribution of the paper is the introduction of a new 3PR C scheme for the sum of ranks composition scheme and a new 3PR C scheme for the maximized minimum of ranks composition scheme. These protocols consist of several rounds. Each round uses the privacy-preserving set intersection protocol by Freedmen et al. as building block.
We assume that prior to the execution of any of our protocols the two parties A and B agree upon a semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme. The parties choose their public and private key pairs for the encryption scheme and exchange their public keys. We denote the public encryption functions of A and B with E A and E B and their private decryption functions with D A and D B . Parties A and B have policies P A = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) and P B = (b 1 , . . . , b l ) consisting of policy rules drawn from the same domain {0, 1} n (Remark 3.1). In both 3PR
C protocols we assume that P A and P B have 3 It is important to note that in the Freedman et al. schemes the server learns the size of X C . Other schemes avoid this leakage at the cost of efficiency (e.g., [23] in the case of private cardinality matching and [24] for private set intersection).
the same number of policy rules, that is k = l. Furthermore, P A and P B are in decreasing order of ≤ A and ≤ B .
A. 3PR C Protocol for the Sum of Ranks Composition Scheme
The objective of the following 3PR C protocol is for the two parties A and B to determine one common policy rule max in a privacy-preserving manner that maximizes the joint preference order on P A ∩ P B defined by
3PR
C Protocol: For each policy rule a i ∈ P A (i = 1, . . . , k)
we define f 
and sends them together with E Step 2
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, c C scheme for the sum of ranks composition scheme that A and B have the same number k of policy rules and each rank is assigned to exactly one policy rule. However, this does not limit A and B to define less than k valid policy rules, as A and B can simply augment their valid policies to contain k rules by appending policy rules containing only zeros for every attribute. A matching zero policy as result of 3PR C then indicates that A and B do not share a single valid policy rule.
C protocol always terminates with one of the parties finding a match. This is due to the fact that for each pair (l, s)
Step l+s−1. To be precise, for l < s, a l is compared with b s by A and for s ≤ l, b s is compared with a l by B in Step l+s−1. Let max = a l = b s be a match found in Step l + s − 1. Then no match was found in any previous step of the Commitment Phase. We claim that then max maximizes the sum of the ranks of all elements in the intersection P A ∩ P B . If this was not the case, then there would be a pair (a r , b v ) with a r = b v ∈ P A ∩ P B and r + v < s + l. As a consequence, a r would have been compared to b v already in Step r + v − 1 of the Commitment Phase. This obviously contradicts the assumption.
The 3PR C scheme uses one round of the private intersection protocol of Freedman et al. in each round. If A (B) would learn anything besides preference-maximizing policy rules at the end of the protocol, A (B) would have had to learn this in one of the rounds. As each round is privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model, A (B) learns nothing in any round unless a match is found. If a match is found by A (B), A (B) may learn more than one preference maximizing policy rule. 4 This is due to the fact that more than one pair of policy rules is evaluated by A (B) in each round. Upon termination of the protocol in
Step i both parties also learn about the correlation of their preferences of max to i. Obviously, the protocol with the additional subrounds is privacy-preserving in the semihonest model. 5 It is important to note that while deviations from the protocol always imply privacy violations, a malicious party will not necessarily profit from deviations in terms of maximizing its preferences. This is due to the fact that the combined preference order depends on the preference order of the honest party. In order to profit from deviations a malicious party would need to know the honest party's preference order at the time of initiation of reconciliation. As a consequence, in situations where A and B reconcile their policies only once and have to follow the result later on, deviations from the protocol are unattractive for either party.
Following the analysis of Freedman et al., for policies of size O(k), the communication overhead of the protocol is bounded by O(k 2 ) and the computational overhead is bounded by O(k 2 ln ln k). A more detailed analysis can be found in the journal version of this paper. The performance of this protocol is evaluated in [25] .
B. 3PR
C protocol for the maximized minimum of ranks compostion scheme
The objective of the following 3PR C protocol is for the two parties A and B to determine a common policy rule max in a privacy-preserving manner that maximizes the joint preference order on P A ∩ P B defined by
3PR
C Protocol for Maximized Minimum Composition:
Within this protocol description, we reuse the definitions of f
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Remark 4.2: Unlike in the 3PR
C scheme for the sum of ranks composition scheme, the 3PR C scheme for the maximized minimum of ranks composition scheme allows the same This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the ICC 2007 proceedings.
rank to be assigned to multiple policy rules assuming that A and B still have the same number k of policy rules.
Discussion: For P A ∩ P B = ∅, the Commitment Phase of the 3PR C protocol for the maximized minimum of ranks always terminates with one of the parties finding a match. This is due to the fact that for each with a 1 , . . . a i by B. Let max be the first match found in round i of the Commitment Phase and let without loss of generality max(min(rank A (max), rank B (max))) = rank A (max). Then, max maximizes the minimum of the ranks of all policies in the intersection P A ∩P B . If this was not the case, then there was a policy rule p ∈ P A ∩ P B with min(rank A (p), rank B (p)) > rank A (max) This implies that rank A (p) > rank A (max) and rank B (p) > rank A (max) and A and B would have committed to p in a round prior to round i. As a consequence, p would have been found in a prior round. This obviously contradicts the assumption.
The 3PR C for the maximized minimum of ranks scheme uses one round of the private intersection protocol of Freedman et al. in each round. If A (B) would learn anything besides preference-maximizing policies at the end of the protocol, A (B) would have had to learn this in one of the rounds. As each round is privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model, A (B) learns nothing in any round unless a match is found. As argued before, this match always is a preference-maximizing policy rule. However, as in the 3PR
C for the sum of ranks composition scheme, A (B) may find more than one preferencemaximizing policy rule. This is due to the fact that in each round of the Commitment Phase A (B) evaluates several pairs of policy rules for which the maximized minimum of ranks is the same. Upon termination of the protocol in Step i both parties also learn about the correlation of their preferences of max to i. Consequently, the protocol is privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model. 6 It is important to note that while deviations from the protocol always imply privacy violations, a malicious party will not necessarily profit from deviations in terms of maximizing its preferences. This is due to the fact that the combined preference order depends on the preference order of the honest party. In order to profit from deviations, a malicious party would need to know the honest party's preference order at the time of initiation of reconciliation.
Following the analysis of Freedman et al., for policies of size O(k), the communication overhead of the protocol is bounded by O(k 2 ) and the computational overhead is bounded by O(k 2 ln ln k) (more details are provided in the journal version of this paper). A performance evaluation of this protocol can be found in [25] .
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we addressed the problem of distributed privacy-preserving policy reconciliation, in particular, how multiple parties reconcile their security policy while only revealing the parts of their policy that are required to achieve a communication association. Using our two 3PR C protocols, parties can rank their policies according to their preferences. The first of our new protocols then returns the policy that maximizes the sum of the ranks of the individual preferences. The second of our new protocols returns the policy that maximizes the minimum of the ranks of the individual preferences. We accomplish this, for policies of size O(k) with communication overhead bounded by O(k 2 ) and computational overhead bounded by O(k 2 ln ln k).
